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Abstract 
Assessing the impact of a policy before implementation has often been a difficult feat to achieve, both 
at the macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. This challenge becomes even more daunting in the 
context of a developing country and has encouraged enormous amount of research over an extended 
period of time using different models. Traditional models for assessing the impact of policy 
implementation are fragmented given the assumption that factors affecting such policies are 
homogeneous whilst neglecting the interactions between various markets.  Agent-based modelling can 
overcome this limitation given its capability to provide a micro-founded macroeconomic analysis of 
policy, within a variety of economic conditions and policy objectives to facilitate the understanding of 
the observed response. Against this backdrop, the current work adopts an agent based framework to 
investigate three distinct policies that have been employed by some advanced countries towards 
achieving sustainable development goals. This is carried out to derive lessons and explore opportunities 
for enhancing policy implementation in developing countries. Agent representation involve decisions 
by involve manufacturers, households (final goods consumers), banks (loan issues & bankruptcy 
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warning), central bank (Basel monitor & monetary policy activity), government (fiscal policy role) and 
singular energy market supplier, which enables consideration of: the impact of unemployment benefits 
on the labour market; the impact of capital investment subsidy on investment levels; and the impact of 
energy taxes (in the form of an increase in the energy cost structure) on a developing country’s 
macroeconomic system. Results shows that an increase in unemployment benefits led to improvements 
in the labour market and reduction in wage margin, with a limitation threshold of 50%. Additionally, it 
was observed that the economy becomes more sensitive to energy tax due to higher unemployment 
benefits, although the diminishing nature of the relationship was quite noticeable.  
 
Keywords: Development policies; Incentives & unemployment benefit; Investment incentives; 
Production efficiency; Development economy; Agent based model  
1 Introduction 
In the past few years, the United Nation (UN) came up with 17 goals to transform the world under the 
auspices of key sustainable development goals (SDGs) with the view to end poverty, protect the planet 
and ensure prosperity for all [1]. While some developing countries have recorded resounding success 
in attempts to achieve the SDGs, more have lagged behind in this endeavour. A number of reasons have 
been identified with the key factor being the overall global economic slowdown in the region. In some 
of the developing countries and other developed countries in the West that have excelled during this 
period, a few policies have been identified as integral to achieving the SDGs.  The key questions 
therefore are: (i) how would similar policies be harnessed in the context of development transition, 
especially in Africa? (ii) How would a policy such as increases in the unemployment benefits impact 
the economic system of a developing country?  (iii) Given that many developing countries are already 
struggling with insufficient public funds, would the benefits of such a policy outweigh the costs? (iv) 
How would an investment subsidy policy, which subsidizes the cost of investment in the best 
technology in any given industry impact on economic outcomes?  (v) Will such policies bring a typical 
developing country closer to achieving the SDGs, or would it constitute a disadvantage to an already 
fragile economy? Providing answers to the highlighted questions through the lens of agent based 
modelling is the focus of this work. 
 
Many theoretical and empirical macroeconomic studies have been undertaken with the view to provide 
viable answers to such questions. In fact, it can be argued that, given the current data availability, some 
of these questions have already been answered to an extent and their empirical analysis thereof have 
been well exhausted. However, most of empirical analysis provided in the extant literature have adopted 
traditional models for assessing the viability of some of the questions highlighted. Such approaches are 
fragmented given the assumption that the underlying factors considered are homogeneous in nature 
whilst neglecting the interactions between various factors. The use of agent based modelling (ABM) 
technique have been empirically verified to possess the capability to address such limitations [2-4], due 
to its ability to generate events of heterogeneous activities based on embedded decision rules and 
learning process using bottom up approaches [5, 6]. Another competitive edge that the use of ABM 
offers lies in its ability to integrate phenomena such as cognitive science, evolutionary economics and 
computer science in a systematic fashion for addressing real life problems [7]. A popular version of a 
comprehensive macroeconomic ABM is the Eurace@Unibi, which is often parametrised to replicate 
empirical settings of a macro economy with the view to evaluate the efficacy of any given policy [8]. 
The modus operandi of the Eurace is to explain socio-economic phenomena through the construction 
of artificial societies with the view to generate explanations and observe trickle effects from the bottom 
upwards [9]. In essence, it simulates crucial connections in the real economy and many other facets of 
the macroeconomy owing to micro specifications and rules [10]. The ABM is therefore an alternative 
approach aimed at achieving a more wholesome and comprehensive representation of the economy 
without having to deal with the data limitations that often plague empirical analysis. As such, it can be 
adopted to understand the modern economy better and, more importantly, to assess many of the policy 
strategies, which are often blindly followed, before they are implemented.  
 
In light of the above, the current work extends and adapt an existing agent based source code for two 
purposes: (1) to promote the standard application of an agent-based framework; and (2) to evaluate 
hypothetical policy sensitivity with respect to efforts geared towards attaining SDGs in the context of 
developing countries. An extension of the Eurace@Unibi open source fits this purpose owing to its 
market size coverage and model features such as multinomial choice by households and the Leontief 
production function. Additionally, a great deal of time is saved on the modelling of new framework 
given the provisions for well-grounded, free codes for policy evaluation.  
 
Through the adoption of the existing ABM model, the current work exploits the simulation performance 
of low profit tax rates at 10% and 20% before proceeding with further scenarios. This adaptation for a 
developing transition is reflected through low profit tax for attracting investors and varying 
unemployment benefit rates, while providing an industrious computational avenue for experiments with 
policy initiatives, shocks and other pertinent issues important for a developing economy in as far as 
sustainable development is concerned. The ability to simulate a realistic economic environment without 
the problems caused by limited data availability makes an ABM analysis of potential policy designs a 
significant addition to the macroeconomic literature.  
 
From a macroeconomics perspective, the focus of this study is to explore a few of the policy designs 
that are often adopted in order to push developing countries towards attaining the stated SDGs. In this 
regard we focus our analysis on the impact of unemployment insurance in the form of unemployment 
benefits. In essence we use the adapted ABM to assess how changes in the magnitude of unemployment 
benefits, ranging from 10% to 50% of previous income, interplay with different macroeconomic 
outcomes in the embedded economic environment. This question has been explored in studies that 
analyse labour market policies, although their ability to explore the interplays which this paper explores, 
has been limited [11-14]. The general consensus in the literature is that unemployment benefits, while 
great for welfare, can be detrimental to the labour market owing to the negative incentives generated. 
However, there are studies which have found a positive relation between unemployment benefits and 
post-employment earnings and duration [11]. This paper will therefore expand on the overall impact of 
an often promoted labour market policy. 
 
The paper also considers the often proposed capital investment subsidy [15, 16] and its interplay with 
the labour market, policy sensitivity in the economy and investment levels. This subsidy is designed 
specifically to target investors that invest in the best technology in that specific industry. The idea is 
that it creates an environment where firms have an incentive to invest in the best technology in order to 
obtain the said subsidy and this would in turn lead to gains from improved technology assimilation in 
the economy. The general consensus in the literature supports this finding. Empirical results point to an 
increased investment activity and better outcomes when some investment subsidy exists. However, the 
opposite occurs when unfavourable conditions are attached to such subsidies [17-20]. In these scenarios, 
ABM analysis can uncover both the impact on the investment outcomes in the economy and the indirect 
impact on other aspects of the economy. In such a scenario, the possible negative impact of this policy 
design can be envisaged and duly accounted for.  
 
Finally, the study assesses changes in energy tax as a cost component of the production function of 
firms in the economy, and examine how such changes interplay with other aspects of the economy. 
From a theoretical perspective, we anticipate an increase in energy tax (this tax assumes that energy 
prices will rise in the future and will drive the switch to renewable energy), which will lead to an 
increase in costs and a reduction in output in the system. However, given the goal of such a tax does 
not necessarily lead to an immediate increase in renewable energy usage or an immediate decrease in 
costs, but rather to a reduction in energy consumption over the long term. We experience the impact of 
such a change over two decades after the energy tax has been implemented.  
 
To summarise, the cardinal aim of the current work is to explore comprehensively some of the other 
interplays of policy initiatives that are often untestable in empirical analysis, which has to focus on a 
single dependent variable at a time. Against this backdrop, the current work therefore investigates the 
following:  
i.) The impact of unemployment benefits on the labour market in a developing country 
ii.) The impact of investment (best capital technology) subsidy (i.e., producers are only 
subsidised when  
              they invest in the best technology in the industry) 
iii.) The impact of an energy tax (in the form of an increase in the energy price–cost structure) on 
system.  
 
In the light of the above, the remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, a brief review 
on unemployment benefits, capital relevance to manufacturing and performance, and policies for 
enhancing development. The review presented in section 2 forms the lens through which the current 
work is viewed. The methodology extension underpinning the adopted agent-based model is provided 
in Section 3. In section 4, the findings of the results are presented and discussed as well as highlighting 
the implications of the research on policy effectiveness leading to summary and concluding remarks in 
Section 5. 
2 Literature review  
Several studies have been undertaken into the relevance of social security policies in developing 
countries. For example, Ginneken [21] examined the role of social security coverage, adjustment and 
poverty globally, showing that developing countries lagged behind significantly with this programme 
and several other social policies. The article was written over a decade ago, but not much has changed 
in the implementation of social benefit frameworks in several African countries. Wibbels and Ahlquist 
[22] studied development, trade and social insurance in developing countries. Arguing that 
governments’ choice of development strategies is conditioned by the size of the domestic market, the 
relative abundance of labour and land inequality in a closed international trading system, they suggested 
that economic policies in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s had important implications for the emergence and 
current contours of social policy in the developing world. 
 
Economic growth and improving living standards have benefited several regions of the world since the 
industrial revolution, but Africa is portrayed as exception owing to several factors. According to 
findings by Oketch [23], Africa needs both human and physical capital investments to attain industrial 
development, as the sources of labour productivity growth in the medium term in African nations are 
high investments in physical and human capital. Evidence of capital structure and firm performance 
have been investigated with theoretical and empirical data supporting this notion. See for example [24] 
on the case of Nigeria, and [25] on Kenya. As such, our adapted ABM echoes that human and physical 
capital investments are required to improve economic productivity and stimulate industrial 
development.  
 
Attaining these industrial developments at a faster pace requires effective and stable government 
interventions. In addition to social benefits for unemployment, investment and job creation must be 
stimulated. This requires effective government interventions in developing economies, for example 
subsidy interventions. Input subsidy programmes in the agricultural sector are on the increase in some 
African countries south of the Sahara. These programmes have proven to be successful in aiding poverty 
reduction and diminishing price shocks [26]. The input subsidy programmes are a favoured policy tool 
of many African governments in partnership with international institutes.  
 
Questions arise about subsidy programmes in the manufacturing sector. The high presence of large 
foreign-owned manufacturers poses challenges. However, subsidy incentives in the South Africa’s film 
and television sector, for example, led to social and labour market transformation in the sector. The 
objectives of the subsidies (job creation, and the transfer of skills and knowledge) were attained [27]. 
Although South Africa may be considered to be an emerging economy, it plays an intermediary role for 
evaluating this policy effectiveness. Based on a review comparison between South Africa, Malaysia 
and Singapore, and the promotion of investment in the manufacturing industries of these countries, 
Wentzel and Steyn [28] suggested that incentive introduction or modification should be considered in 
South Africa. They could also apply to investment in capital assets, capital allowances for equipment 
used to produce renewable energy, incentives for research and development, and several other identified 
areas. An incentive subsidy example for South Africa is towards development of the auto industry, 
which has aided development of new techniques and technologies. See for example [29] on reviews of 
economics of the South African motor industry, and [30]on manufacturing performance and policy in 
South Africa.  
 
Beg et al. (2002)[31] noted that, although economic growth and poverty reduction are the main priorities 
of policy-makers in developing countries, climate change mitigation provide opportunities that can lead 
indirectly to the improved integration of environment and development issues such as income 
distribution. Theoretically, unemployment benefits can be framed as the beneficial redistribution of 
gains in public wealth due to improved development and growth. The social benefit is also viewed as a 
means of poverty and crime reduction. Public admiration of government relevance and support through 
benefits from tax payments are used as political subjects for incentive votes for a working government 
and a system that empowers the poor [32]. On the other hand, studies have criticized effects on 
unemployment benefits to the labour market. For instance, Nickell[33] associated presence of high 
unemployment with an indefinite condition of generous unemployment benefits, high overall taxes and 
union wage bargaining. Lack of pressure and willingness to obtain work were also cited as contributing 
factor towards unemployment, which also vary to differences in social insurance programs. With this 
view, the study restricts benefit threshold to 50%, and in view of affordability structure for a developing 
economy.  
If a policy is developed to stimulate investment, its benefits should include job creation, skilling the 
population through research development and employee skills demand, innovation, technology 
diffusion, production growth, sales and higher tax revenue for government owing to increased 
employment and production. To structure a non-biased investment subsidy system, policy-makers must 
devise system administration processes, and take into account the time and implementation costs of 
searching for and identifying the best investments and firms to subsidise. Competition and firm size 
may hamper subsidy access for small firms and or new start-ups. Government may subsidise 
investments that firms would have made without access to subsidies [34], other than challenge of higher 
subsidy rate costs to sustain during economic downturns, while subsidy payments are not guaranteed to 
the achieve goals of the policy. 
 
2.1 The role of agent based modelling for testing the efficacy of policy initiatives 
As highlighted earlier, a number of definitions exist for ABM in the literature but based on practical 
applications, it can simply be described as a decentralised approach to model design where the active 
entities (i.e. the agents) which can be individuals, companies, assets, communities are identified by the 
modeller. The behaviours (i.e. main drivers, memory) of these active entities are then defined and put 
into a certain environment where connections between all defined parameters can be established. 
Traditional models for assessing the impact of policy implementation abound but their underlying 
framework are fragmented given the assumption that factors affecting such policies are homogeneous 
whilst neglecting the interactions between various factors.  Agent-based modelling can overcome this 
limitation given its capability to provide a micro-founded macroeconomic analysis of policy, within a 
variety of economic conditions and policy objectives to facilitate the understanding of the observed 
response. Accordingly, a number of researchers have adopted ABM framework to test the efficacy of 
policy initiatives.  
 
For instance, in their work Snape, Boait [4] employed ABM to ascertain whether domestic consumers 
in the UK will adopt the renewable heat incentive (RHI) introduced by the UK government to encourage 
the use of renewable energy generation technologies such as heat pumps. They provided a detailed 
analysis of different barriers, notably non-financial barriers, to the uptake of such incentives and 
concluded that there is a tipping point beyond which the adoption of the RHI is likely to decline very 
sharply due to the complex and stringent compliance requirements for RHI. Their results based on ABM 
was able to highlight other factors that was missed by the policy makers as to the slow rate adoption of 
RHI in the UK.  
 
Similarly, Malleson, Heppenstall [35] adopted ABM to gain a deeper understanding of processes behind 
crime with the view to improve upon existing policies towards the development of crime prevention 
strategies that are efficient and effective. Their work allows for both human and environmental factors 
to be simulated based on ABM. Additionally, Bloomquist [36] carried out a comparison of ABM to 
ascertain how they can be tailored to inform policy decisions regarding the evasion of income tax. Their 
work emphasised the importance of validity for models with the view to represent phenomena in the 
real world which policy makers may find useful and interesting. ABM has been used in informing 
decisions in land use science [37]; land use and land cover change [38]; regional land-use research [39] 
ecological economics [40, 41]; seasonal climate forecast applications among smallholder farmers [42]; 
and a host of other areas too numerous to be mentioned.  
 
However, in the context of employing ABM towards testing the efficacy of policy initiatives in 
developing countries especially in Africa, there is opportunity for intensifying research work in this 
area. This constitute a major challenge that must be addressed given the rate at which policy initiatives 
are created in Africa without adequate information on the efficacy of such policies in instances where 
they are implemented. Against this backdrop, this work seeks to address this gap in knowledge by 
adopting a robust ABM model to test the efficacy of a policy initiative. In the section that follows, a 
brief description of the overall methodological framework is presented. 
3 Methodology – Sustainable development transition  
Stern [43] debated the benefits of developing an integrated, transdisciplinary science of human-energy 
interactions towards enhancing roles of energy consumers and energy producers in influencing further 
development and regulation decisions. In the model extension, a single energy supply market is 
integrated for determining average energy prices to meet the constant energy demands of manufacturers. 
Energy consumption and cost are only considered for manufacturers that sustain additional production 
input, such as transport and electricity costs. Equation 1 shows energy price updates with constant mark-
up 𝜂 = 0.1 and change in demand from last two periods (t-2, t-1) ∆𝐸𝐷. For regulation and market shock 
sensitivity using the same simulation environment, Equation 2 depicts the price increase structure with 
energy tax levy (𝒯𝑡𝑒 tax rate). These factor in consumers’ response to energy price change with 
economic development. According to Fouquet [44], the level of economic developments varies with 
energy consumption service. For example, at low levels of economic development, energy service 
consumption tends to be quite responsive to per capita income changes; at mid-levels, consumption 
tends to be very responsive to changes in income per capita; and, at high levels, consumption is less 
responsive to income changes. This inference the importance of formulating integrated energy service 
policies to reduce risks to developing countries of locking in to carbon intensive infrastructure or 
behaviour. A raw material supplier agent is integrated in a simplistic manner to adjust for raw material 
input demand. The manufacturer is a price taker of an exogenously given price determined with a 
constant monthly mark-up described by Equation 3.   
𝑝𝑡𝐸 = [1 + 𝜂][1+∆𝐸𝐷]𝑝𝑡−1𝐸          (1) 𝑝𝑡𝐸, 𝒯𝑡𝑒 = [1 + 𝒯𝑡𝑒]𝑝𝑡𝐸          (2) 𝑝𝑡𝑀 = [1 + 𝜂]𝑝𝑡−1𝑀           (3) 
 
With the notion that without guidance and incentives, rapid economic development is likely to lock 
consumers into high energy service prices in the long run and bind the economy onto a high energy 
intensity trajectory with major long-run economic and environmental impacts (Fouquet, 2016). 
Producer incentives are another approach to contributing to technological change and economic 
development, and therefore also to material waste reduction and production efficiency due to input–
output ratios.  
 
To account for production incentives, a manufacturer’s production cost (𝜌𝑡) comprises energy cost (𝑝𝑡𝐸, 𝒯𝑡𝑒𝑞𝐸), raw material cost (𝑝𝑡𝑀𝑞𝑀), labour cost (𝑝𝑡𝐿𝑞𝐿)  and capital cost (𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑞𝐶𝑥 − 𝑆𝑡𝐶,𝑉𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑞𝐶𝑉). This 
is summed by Equation 4, where 𝑝𝑡𝑀 is material price, 𝑝𝑡𝐿 labour price and 𝑝𝑡𝐶 capital price; and 𝑞𝐸 is 
quantity of energy, 𝑞𝑀 is material quantity, 𝑞𝐿 is employee quantity and 𝑞𝐶𝑥 capital. 𝑆𝑡𝐶,𝑉 is subsidy rate. 
With output 𝑌𝑡 based on a Leontief function,  production technology 𝜏 is resource efficiency of a 
manufacturer’s capital stock and average employee skills at time 𝑇. Production technology is 
manufacturer specific and advances according to new developments in capital investments and 
employee skills. To qualify for a capital subsidy, a manufacturer agent has to take delivery of capital 
goods above a certain level (≥ 𝑉) in the system, classified as criteria for a best technology threshold.  
 
Overtime capital stock of vintages is subject to depreciation, as depicted by Equation 5. As 
manufacturers require capital loan to embark on new capital investments, governance of capital finance 
becomes vital through the credit market in order to minimize system run effects from producer 
bankruptcy. The credit market design logic is of interest as several African economies are already 
implementing or planning to implement a Basel II bank capital requirement system [45]. The bank agent 
follows a Basel II framework making the model a good fit to integrate credit market role in sourcing 
production capital loans, which further aids development, amid challenges facing banking system in 
Africa. A finding by Nyantakyi and Munemo [46] on Ghana, Tanzania and Kenya firm data suggests 
that increasing policy access to better capital goods will spur technology gains from positive 
productivity in the African manufacturing sector.  
 
To note, the investment criteria and capacity is in reference to vintage level which indirectly portrays 
employee skills level and demand by the manufacturer. Labour cost is due to employee wages matched 
with number of wage offers and skills in the system. Employees make up the subset of household agents 
and as such wage is ranked according to matching mean wage offer and skills, or mean wage owing to 
number of employees (?̅?/𝑞𝐿). Wage offer is updated with Equation 6. The model accounts for the 
redistribution of wealth, with total income estimated as summation of unemployment benefit, dividend 
payment and bond interest income. Unemployment payment is calculated as percentage of last labour 
income and may trigger an economic burden during economic downswings at higher rates. For 
unemployment brackets to balance in the system, the labour market and employment rate strike out. At 
lower unemployment rates, unemployment benefits are deemed less burdensome to the government at 
both low and high unemployment benefit rates. At higher unemployment rates, the unemployment 
benefit rate is critical for weighing on government budget.    
 
Both energy and raw materials are dependent on production level derived from labour and the capital 
input technology process. Proportional levels of production input to output are described by Equation 
7, where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are coefficients of production levels. Energy demand is then driven by resource 
efficiency of manufacturer investment decisions. The higher the investments, and depending on capital 
vintage levels, the higher production costs borne, which transmit to efficiency of input cost savings and 
subsidy gains, creating a triple-win scenario for the government, manufacturer and the environment. 
These stimulate investment, job creation and waste reduction from production efficiency. On the other 
hand, a failed policy outcome may not reflect in the subsidy cost burden on government, while 
households may also bear the costs of higher final goods prices and/or inventories of unsold goods by 
manufacturers.   
 𝜌𝑡  = ∑ 𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑞𝐶𝑥 − 𝑆𝑡𝐶,𝑉𝑝𝑡𝐶𝑞𝐶𝑉 + 𝑝𝑡𝐿𝑞𝐿  +  𝑝𝑡𝐸, 𝒯𝑡𝑒𝑞𝐸  + 𝑝𝑡𝑀𝑞𝑀      (4) 𝐾𝑡 =  (1 − 𝛿) 𝐾𝑡−1𝑥 +  Δ𝐼𝑡𝑥       (5) 𝑊𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙 =  𝑊𝑡−1𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙(1 + 𝑤𝑡𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑙𝑙);  𝑖𝑓 𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦 > 𝑚𝑖𝑛(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦)  (6) 𝐸𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 𝛼𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝜏  ; 𝑀𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 = 𝛽𝑌𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝜏      (7) 
 
Output price follows a general pricing rule of production cost divided by total production quantity, and 
a constant mark up of 20%. Production is delivered to a distribution centre where households are 
randomly matched and ranked weekly, according to a multinomial logit process. Sales amounts are then 
recorded according to inventory levels at the distribution centre. Profit is revenue from sales less 
production cost. Profit tax is levied when > 0. For government agents, revenue is composed of tax 
revenue, bond finance and dividends, while expenses include manufacturer subsidy, bond purchase, 
interest payment and investment expenditures. When an existing model is applied, this section avoids 
repeating equations that can be found in [10, 47]. This study observes system performance, production 
investment incentives and unemployment benefit policies, with scenarios in Table 1. The assumption 
is that a growing economy is associated with a growing energy demand, therefore investment support 
through best capital purchase subsidies may improve production efficiency and job creation. The 
challenge is to evaluate policy sustainability. Bazilian et al. [48] reviewed various challenges 
concerning governments’ role in promoting energy security, managing climate change and ensuring 
environmental sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. A need for increased focus on interrelated aspects 
of energy governance and policy to induce investment and alleviate poverty was identified.  
 
Table 1: The study provides simulation scenarios that compare the following: 




Corporate profit tax 10%, 20%;  
Subsidy 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%;  
Unemployment benefit rate 10%, 20%, 30%, 
40%, 50%;  
*C1; 
We compare two corporate profit tax rates as 
factors that influence producer investment 
behaviour and the sourcing of government 
revenue. 
Corporate profit tax 10% 
Subsidy 0%, 5%, 10%, 15%; 
Unemployment benefit rate 10%, 20%, 30%, 
40%, 50%;  
Energy Tax 2.5%, 5%, 7.5%, 10%, 12.5%, 
15%, 17.5%, 20%;  
*C2. 
4 Results 
Trends in output, energy consumption, wages, investment levels and unemployment rates over a period 
of 20 years are presented. These may contribute to questions about sustainability of policy actions in 
several developing countries with low or non-standard unemployment benefit structures. The agent 
population includes one capital goods supplier, 80 firms, one central distributor, 1 800 households, 20 
financial services providers, one government, one central bank, one clearing centre, one energy supply 
market, and one raw materials supply market. Results are provided figuratively. Figures 1 to 4 depict 
selected trends sequentially over 20 years, while figures 5 to 9 depict average values for the same 20-
year period. Results show that in an atypical developing country economy, performance varies in 
response to different policy rates. For example, in Figure 1, a 20% profit tax in tandem with a 10% best 
capital investment subsidy indicates the highest return on tax revenue.  
 
 Figure 1: Confirmation of tax revenue benefits in simulation trial at 50% Unemployment benefit rate 
 
 
Figure 2: Confirmation of production sales benefits in simulation trial at 50% Unemployment benefit rate 
 
In a similar manner in Figures 2 to 4, we again see a positive impact of a 10% profit tax and above 10% 
investment subsidy on production sales, although when we consider both unemployment and good 
prices, we see a significant increase in both as a result of such a policy. Bearing in mind that, all the 
policies tested in Figures 1 to 4 are coupled with a 50% unemployment benefit, and the effects of these 
policies traced over the next 20 years in the economy. In the first two cases, there is an initial drop in 
both tax revenue and production sales, however as the economy adjusts, the benefits of such a policy 
begin to manifest in the system. In the two other cases in Figures 3 and 4 however, the initial impact is 
a sharp rise in both goods prices and unemployment, and then a gradual fall. The economy does not 
really recover to its pre-policy levels however. This implies that caution must be exercised when it 
comes implementing such policies within a developing economy setting. Reasons for such reactions in 
the system could be due to the affordability structure. In subsequent analysis, we vary the 
unemployment benefit rate from 50% to 30%, and this does not seem to improve the impact of profit 
tax and investment subsidy on unemployment in the long-run (See Figures c & d, in the appendix).  
Observations suggests unemployment benefit seems initially unsustainable in long term without 
investment stimulating subsidy as tax revenue falls over the 20 years trend. This is also reflected in the 
gross domestic product (GDP) recorded (figure a2, in the appendix), although not on a downward steep 
as tax revenue (figure a1, in the appendix). This is not the same with 50% UB, as improvements in tax 
revenue (figure a3, in the appendix) and GDP (figure a4, in the appendix) are observed. This could 
imply gains from improved production and sales as reflected in Figure 2, which is supported by 
Nicholson and Needels’[49] theory that unemployment insurance aids consumption power for 
employees out of work. A notable limitation of our simulation is lack of consideration of differing 
unemployment benefit according to unemployment rate in the system, which has been challenged 
theoretically and empirically to influence consumption trade off and job search behaviour according to 
business cycles [50]. Nonetheless, subsidies play complementary role to shocking unemployment 
benefit cost to the system. 
 
 
Figure 3: Overtime subsidy effect on average goods price at 50% unemployment benefit rate 
 
 Figure 4: Overtime subsidy effect on employment at 50% unemployment benefit rate 
 
If we consider the response of other macroeconomic phenomena such as wage margins, the reduction 
of which has a potential to reduce wage and income inequality concerns of many developing countries. 
Figure 5 presents the results of the inquest into this. The result presents a 20-year average rather than 
progression over the subsequent 20 years (as in Figures 1 to 4). This allows us to compare variations in 
investment subsidy rate, profit tax rate, and unemployment benefit rate, and examine the overall 
response in the economy. We see that higher unemployment benefit rates reduce wage margins and 
lead, and this reduction is more evident when combined increases in subsidy. More importantly, Figure 
5 confirms increases in average wage levels owing to higher profit tax rates (10%, 20%), higher 
unemployment benefit or higher subsidy rates. Findings support suggestions [51] that subsidies aid 
wage increases. This was after authors investigated the impact of public subsidies on business enterprise 
research in selected OECD countries.  
 
Real wage is calculated as nominal wage over consumption goods price (𝑊𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑇𝑅 =  ∑ 𝑁𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒?̅?𝑔𝑜𝑜𝑑𝑠)𝑛𝑖 , 
indicating the role of the price level on household behaviour. Within this model, and in assessing the 
potential of a policy such as unemployment benefits in a developing economy setting, the indirect role 
of such a benefit, in addition to the income sourced from investment dividends, and bond interest, all 
come together to form household income. As such, with increasing social benefits, real wage margins 
and or patterns are indicative of positive or negative economic impacts. Figure 5 suggests that increasing 
social benefits reduce the wage gap, but drive down wages, while the introduction of investment 
subsidies increases wage levels. These subsidy additions contribute to cyclical increases in goods prices 
(Figure 3), which may be linked to increasing investment levels (Figure 6).   
 Figure 5: 20 year averages for Wage.  
 
In Figures 6 and 7, further analysis of changes in investment, wages and employment due to policy 
changes in the system and the sensitivity thereof are compared, by varying the levels of unemployment 
benefits. Although it is literature suggest that efficiency improves as subsidies and investment gains 
increase, Figure 8 shows that a minimal increase in energy production levels as investment subsidies 
go up. The more sensitive energy production however comes in the presence of much lower 
unemployment benefits in the system. A possible reason for this, is the fact that in many developing 
countries, energy production endeavours are carried out by the state, with the main power company 
being a state owned company. As such increased state welfare demands may result in substitution of 
funds from one endeavour to the other.  
 
The results obtained from the ABM simulations are quite vast given the comprehensive nature of the 
economic environment of the model. The paper focuses on a few of the variables of interest. The 
simulations show, for example, an increase in the wage gap (Figure 5) as unemployment benefits reduce 
from 50% to 10% while the subsidy rate remains constant. Lower unemployment benefits and profit 
taxes (as opposed to higher levels of unemployment benefits and profit taxes) cause firms to become 
more sensitive to an increase in subsidies. Finally, in contrast to empirical evidence, the simulation 
results show a decline in unemployment rates when unemployment benefits increase. However, the 
decline in unemployment does not continue diminishing as unemployment benefits rise. 
 
 Figure 6: 20 year averages for investment. PTax denotes profit tax and UB represents unemployment benefit rate 
 
 
Figure 7: 20 year averages for unemployment rate 
 
4.1 Investment decision – reflection on employment 
With 10% profit tax providing the better initial scenario performance, the next scenario outputs focus 
on average trends under 10% profit tax system. In Figure 9- environments with lower unemployment 
benefit structures are more responsive and or sensitive to investment subsidies. Using individual seed 
average of 20-year simulation period, a boxplot merges energy tax levies for comparison across subsidy 
rates due to investment decisions and resulting employment gains. The boxplot shows sensitivity spread 
in investment and employment levels according to energy tax rates, which display max and min 
observations along with median (straight line in box) and mean (symbolic representations ▪▼*×♦ for 
10%, 20%, 30%, 40% and 50% unemployment benefit rates respectively) points. Outliers (red cross 




Figure 8: 20 year averages for Energy demand  
 
Although boxplots are more adaptable to large scale data, they can be adopted for smaller data too and 
further ease identification of extreme points and homogeneity in data. It permits easier view of spread 
between data outputs. The 10% UB produced the larger box spread or stretch, signalling it as the most 
responsive to subsidy addition and energy price hikes. With further increase in UB, results suggest 
lower unemployment benefit scenarios are more sensitive and or responsive to subsidy additions and 
energy tax. The sensitivity spreads with energy price hikes is evident from 10%-30% UB. These suggest 
environments with lower social benefits are more prone to climate policies – in the form of energy tax 
and transmission of energy price shocks. Incentive policies prove effective towards stimulating resource 
efficient investment irrespective of the selected unemployment benefit rate. In addition, the combined 
subsidy policy with improved unemployment benefits produced suggest economic improvement 
reflected in unemployment reduction, due to production sales. This suggests a properly regulated 
structure towards attaining effective subsidy goals.  
 
 
Figure 9: Unemployment rate boxplot – Subsidy and Energy Tax inclusion 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper, we employed the ABM approach to assess the interplays between three different policies: 
unemployment benefits, investment subsidies and energy taxes. The goal was to approach some 
empirically tested questions, which are often limited by data availability, by simulating a 
comprehensive economic environment adapted for a developing economy. Within an ABM, the impact 
of a policy initiative can be traced and observed for all possible macroeconomic outcomes, allowing for 
a wholesome assessment of the potential impact of policy initiatives and the uncovering of a lot more 
information. This information could be used to design policies adequately, and to limit the negatives 
and maximise the positives thereof. In this regard, we find that increased unemployment benefits have 
a diminishing impact on the unemployment rate, and as investment subsidies go up, the impact they 
have on reducing the wage gap is a positive return. In such instances developing countries can determine 
which agenda is of most immediate importance and design such policies to meet the immediate need or 
target of the economy.  
 
We also found that the sensitivity of investment level to subsidy changes increases as the level of 
unemployment benefits rises. However, this only occurs until a threshold of about a 30% unemployment 
benefit is reached. Beyond this point, the impact on investment sensitivity reduces as unemployment 
benefits rise. This suggests that developing countries should keep unemployment benefits should in the 
region of 30% in order to limit the sometimes negative labour market impact of such a policy. An 
investigation of increases in energy investments and energy taxes over the 20-year period shows that 
reform in the energy sector is achievable, and should not impact the investment adversely in the long 
run. However, in the short term the negative impact will be significant. 
 
This simulation activity attempted to exploit the ease of applying open ABM for policy case studies. It 
must be noted that, while the ABM approach allows us to analyse the interplays between several sectors 
of the economy, which is an often impossible task with empirical analysis, the outcomes of such an 
approach are highly dependent on the predefined economic environment. This means that some of the 
definitions are needed from previous empirical analysis to make the model more realistic and accurate. 
For large models with several market representations, the model’s accuracy for a typical developing 
economy needs to be investigated cautiously, as the economic environments of diverse developing 
economies differ significantly. Further, as a model created by another modeller, some functions may be 
misinterpreted. Therefore, the way forward would be to build more representative ABMs for individual 
countries. Unique country characteristics should be included in the model to achieve much more 
realistic, relevant and accurate simulation outcomes. A challenge that might arise is the amount of time 
needed to learn and apply an existing model or to build a new representational model. 
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Figure b: Confirmation of production sales benefits in simulation trial at 30% Unemployment benefit rate 
 
 Figure c: Overtime subsidy effect on average goods price at 30% unemployment benefit rate 
 
 
Figure d: Overtime subsidy effect on employment at 30% unemployment benefit rate 
 
 
 
